Showing posts with label communism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label communism. Show all posts

Friday, 15 May 2015

Cuba's Lung Cancer Vaccine

The sudden shift in US-Cuba relations presents the world with a tremendous opportunity in the field of medical research, not least in developing a promising vaccine for lung cancer.
CimaVax is a vaccine treatment for non-small cell lung cancer, targeting a particular protein, epidermal growth factor (EGF), that attaches itself to receptor proteins on the surface of cells causing them to grow and divide. Cancers can cause the body to produce excess EGF to enhance the pace of cell growth. CimaVax is designed to stimulate the body’s immune system, prompting it to produce antibodies in response to the increase in EGF, preventing the protein from attaching to cancer cell receptors.
In theory, this will stop the signal that tells cancer cells to grow, slowing the cancer's likely growth. After 25 years of work at the Centre for Molecular Immunology in Havana, the drug was made available in 2011, free of charge, to patients at clinics and hospitals across the island while it underwent a third set of trials. Researchers looked for signs of an immune response among lung cancer patients and have so far found patients who have taken CimaVax do better.
The patients tested lived slightly longer - on average, between 4 to 6 months - while symptoms, like coughing and breathlessness, were reduced. The trial results also suggest younger patients fare better. Twelve people under the age of 60, who had strong immune responses, lived 15 months longer than previously expected. Any conclusions drawn should come with the caveat that only a small sample of patients were tested.

The politics of CimaVax 
CimaVax’s importance to Cuba is underscored by the fact that lung cancer is the fourth leading cause of death in the country. It is also the leading cause of cancer death in the US.
The results of the first trials in Cuba has triggered follow-ups by researchers in Japan and some European countries, but until now it has been politically impossible for the United States to undertake such trials. In December 2014, however, President Obama and Cuban leader Raul Castro announced their move towards normalising relations. Since then, US delegates have visited Cuba for the first time in over 50 years and, last month, Governor of New York Andrew Cuomo visited Havana in a landmark event for the two countries.

At the same time, the Roswell Park Cancer Institute at the State University of New York closed a historic deal with Cuba’s Centre for Molecular Immunology which will allow Roswell Park’s researchers to bring CimaVax to the US, where it can be put before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The drug can then be put through trials later this year before potentially entering the US health market. With Roswell Park’s financial resources, collaboration may prove beneficial to cancer sufferers around the world as alternative applications of the vaccine are explored.
“The chance to evaluate a vaccine like this is a very exciting prospect,” Roswell Park CEO Candace Johnson told WIRED. The company’s research team plan to explore the vaccine’s potential as a preventative measure in line with a standard vaccine that focuses on preempting conditions rather than minimising their symptoms. It may even be used to treat prostate, colon, breast, pancreatic and other cancers.
The Obama administration has so far relied on executive power to remove restrictions against the importation of medical and research equipment from Cuba. Congress are yet to decide whether or not the US will ultimately lift the trade embargo. If it is lifted, this could a groundbreaking opportunity for scientific and medical collaboration between the countries.

Doing more with less
Notwithstanding five decades of economic sanctions, Fidel Castro gave priority to medical research and biotechnology. “They’ve had to do more with less,” Dr. Johnson told WIRED. “So they’ve had to be even more innovative with how they approach things. For over 40 years, they have had a preeminent immunology community.”
Following a 1981 dengue fever outbreak which infected 350,000 Cuban citizens, Fidel Castro set up a Biological Front to focus the research efforts of different agencies. Mr. Castro dispatched Cuban scientists to Finland where they learned how to synthesise interferon, a virus-fighting protein, bankrolling their lab. By 1991, Cuba had become a major exporter of pharmaceutical products, at first to the USSR, then across Latin America and the developing world.
Today Cuba exports healthcare globally. Cuban health workers recently flew to West Africa to provide support in the multinational efforts to contain Ebola. The Cuban government also ensures the prices of the drugs the country's doctors offer are far below others on the market, in order to give developing countries a preferential option. As part of “south-to-south technology transfers” Cuba has provided support for China, Malaysia, India and Iran to set up pharmaceutical factories.

NOTE: In 2004, Cuba's biotech capacity was noted by American critics, such as UN ambassador John Bolton, as a potential basis for developing "biological weapons". The Cuban government strongly denied these accusations and invited US scientists to observe the laboratories.

As a result of these efforts, Cuba receives $8 billion a year in foreign exchange and financial support from the World Health Organisation. Export of medical services has not just brought in revenue - it has led the Castro brothers to grant over 100 patents to scientists and, in effect, open up the country to intellectual property rights. The prospect of normalised relations between Cuba and the United States thus holds enormous potential for the scientific community.

This article was originally written for The World Weekly on May 14, 2015.

Saturday, 6 December 2014

Vietnam, 50 Years on.

Kennedy – The Beginning
In 1961 the Kennedy administration came into office and inherited the Eisenhower policy of sending military advisors to South Vietnam in support of the Saigon government. The American presence in Vietnam had reached 800 by the close of the Eisenhower era and by 1963 President Kennedy would increase the number of military advisors to 16,000. The first strikes came in 1961 as the Kennedy administration sent war planes with South Vietnamese markings against rural targets where 80% of the population lived and the Viet Cong insurgency had taken root in South Vietnam. The war planes were manufactured in the United States.
When John F. Kennedy first took his seat in the Oval Office, the Viet Cong numbered 300,000. The insurgency was composed of a broad coalition united in opposition to the Saigon government. Its demands included the ouster of American military advisers and the reunification of Vietnam. The Diem regime had banned public assembly, political parties, and even public dancing; its demolition of pagodas and preferential treatment of Catholics had drawn the ire of the mostly Buddhist population. The US began bombing to defeat the resistance to President Diem as it seemed that the regime was not succeeding in defeating the Viet Cong.
By 1962 the US had begun to establish “strategic hamlets” in the country where peasants were held behind barbed-wire enclosures under the watch of South Vietnamese troops. By 1970 5 million Vietnamese peasants were displaced in this way. The pretext was to protect the peasants from the insurgents. At the same time the first use of the so-called rainbow herbicides - most infamously, Agent Orange - was initiated. The aims of the programme were to rapidly defoliate the forestry and kill crops with the hope of denying the Viet Cong cover and food.

Eventually the repressive rule of the Saigon government provoked protests from Buddhist monks. A catalytic moment came in May 1963 when South Vietnamese armed forces fired upon Buddhist protestors in the city of Hue on Phat Dan. The Buddhists had been protesting against the ban on their flag on a holy day. The armed forces opened fire on the crowd with live ammunition and killed nine people. Yet more demonstrations followed with President Diem denying his forces had any responsibility for the deaths.

The civil unrest would last until November 1963 at which point the generals of South Vietnam plotted a coup against the sitting government. Popular opposition grew over those six months. In one act of defiance Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc self-immolated to protest the brutality of the regime. He left a letter reading: “Before closing my eyes and moving towards the vision of the Buddha, I respectfully plead to President Ngo Dinh Diem to take a mind of compassion towards the people of the nation and implement religious equality to maintain the strength of the homeland eternally. I call the venerables, reverends, members of the sangha and the lay Buddhists to organise in solidarity to make sacrifices to protect Buddhism.”

The Kennedy administration understood that this situation was unsustainable and withdrew its aid to the Saigon government in a direct rebuff to President Diem. As the protests continued the US government began to encourage the coup plotters in the South Vietnamese military elite to take action. In November 1963 President Diem was arrested by the army, after an overnight siege of the presidential palace, before being shot and repeatedly stabbed by his bodyguards. His death signalled the end of the Diem government and gave way to direct military rule. The US role is confirmed by the Pentagon Papers: “We maintained clandestine contact with [the plotters] throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government”.
Johnson – Escalation

The end of the Diem regime did not signal the end of US commitments, in fact, according to the Pentagon Papers, “our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities”. Not long after this Kennedy was assassinated on November 22 1963. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the responsibilities of the presidency and would go on to strengthen the war effort even further. Before the shooting President Kennedy spoke at a breakfast held at the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce:
 
We have increased the defence budget of the United States by over 20%; increased the programme of acquisition for Polaris submarines from 24 to 41; increased our Minutemen missile purchase programme by more than 75%; doubled the number of strategic bombers and missiles on alert; doubled the number of nuclear weapons available in the strategic alert forces; increased the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe by over 60%; added five combat ready divisions to the Army of the United States, and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force of the United States; increased counter-insurgency forces which are engaged now in South Vietnam by 600%.

Less than a year later the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place. On August 2, 1964 the USS Maddox was on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam’s coastline. The vessel was allegedly fired upon and retaliated by firing on three North Vietnamese torpedo boats that had been talking it in the Gulf of Tonkin. There were no American casualties. The second incident came on August 4 in which the USS Maddox returned to the coastline and engaged in what were believed to be North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The crew had acted on the basis of sonar evidence that had picked up two vessels. But there was no wreckage or bodies found.

Even though it appeared that there had been no attack the Johnson administration quickly decided to retaliate. The bombing of North Vietnam began immediately and President Johnson began to raise the number of US ground troops. The Tonkin Resolution was fast-tracked and passed on August 7. It would signal a change in US policy as the Johnson administration initiated hostilities with North Vietnam to bypass the congressional restraints on the government. The US government now had free rein in its bombing of the North.

By 1965 South Vietnam had been so devastated that the war correspondent and military historian Bernard Fall claimed that the existence of Vietnam (in particular South Vietnam) was “threatened with extinction”. The US sent 200,000 US troops to South Vietnam that year and in 1966, 200,000 more were sent. By 1968 the US troop presence had exceeded 500,000 soldiers at a cost of $2 billion per month. Up until 1969 the military operations in Vietnam had been conducted by the Democratic administration. Originally President Kennedy had hoped that the US would be able to withdraw from Vietnam in 1965, provided that the war had been won; the change in government would lead to the war being extended further.
Nixon – Enter the Mad Man

By 1968 the Johnson administration was in negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris. Henry Kissinger was an adviser to the US negotiators. The negotiations came in election season. Lyndon B. Johnson had made clear he would not be seeking re-election, a shock to the public; instead his vice president Hubert Humphrey would seek the presidency. Richard Nixon had emerged as the Republican contender. He had pledged “peace with honour” in south east Asia, but secretly he feared that the Democratic government would reach a settlement in Paris and win the election.
Dr. Kissinger was in contact with negotiators as well as the Nixon campaign. He was expecting to work for whoever won the election and ingratiated himself with both campaigns. Henry Kissinger told the Nixon campaign that the US negotiators were close to securing a settlement. The prospect of peace would give Humphrey an advantage over Nixon. The Nixon campaign had opened a secret line with the South Vietnamese regime and persuaded them to withdraw from the negotiations thereby scuppering the possibility of a settlement. Richard Nixon had offered South Vietnam much more support than the Johnson administration and a better deal in the future.
The Nixon administration not only set out to extend the war in North Vietnam they intensified the bombing of Laos and launched an illegal bombing campaign against Cambodia. The Nixon administration claimed that the North Vietnamese were stationing their forces and supplies across the border in Cambodia and pursued the bombing on such grounds. By 1970 President Nixon was growing frustrated that the war showed no sign of coming to an end.

In 1972 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger flew to China and met with Chairman Mao. The US government aimed to open up relations with China to secure its long-term strategic interests. The Sino-Soviet split had left Maoist China isolated on the world stage and if China aligned itself with the US (which it would eventually do) then the Vietnamese would have to choose the side of the Soviet Union over China. The original pretext of US involvement in Vietnam was to contain China and, as the Pentagon Papers confirm, the decision to bomb North Vietnam only made sense in the context of containing communist China.

As the election approached President Nixon began to look at the war effort as an electoral means once again. “I went them to hit everything,” Mr. Nixon told Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger on the orders to General Alexander Haig: “[Nixon] wants a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. He doesn’t want to hear anything. It’s an order, it’s to be done. Anything that flies, on anything that moves.”

Immediately after re-election was secure the White House sanctioned the Christmas bombing campaign, spanning twelve days, targeting Hanoi and Haiphong. The campaign constituted the heaviest bombing campaign of the entire war and it provoked international outcry. Negotiations resumed soon after and by January 1973 Richard Nixon had announced the end of the war. The terms were settled along the lines that had been negotiated back in 1968. Even still, Henry Kissinger would win the Nobel peace Prize for his efforts and the fighting between North and South Vietnam wouldn’t reach a conclusion for two more years.

The Paris Peace Accords were signed not long after the announcement and the US military withdrew its ground forces in March. The North Vietnamese respected the ceasefire agreement as the US government pledged support to the South Vietnamese and further bombing if the North resumes its operations. The President and Dr. Kissinger were planning a resumption of bombing by April, but the orders for further bombing were rescinded as the Watergate scandal broke out. Richard Nixon could not fight the US Congress and Vietnam at the same time. He would become the first US President to be impeached and Gerald Ford succeeded him in August 1974.

The bombing of Cambodia had not ended with Operation Menu. The bombing continued throughout the early 1970s. This eventuated in the collapse of the delicate balance of social forces and classes in Cambodian society. First this led to the dictatorship of Lon Nol, who seized power in 1970, but this would later be swept aside by then the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Not long after Phnom Penh fell to Pol Pot the North Vietnamese seized Saigon. The US withdrawal had left little force to resist the offensive and the South Vietnamese army were quickly overwhelmed.
By early 1976 Vietnam was officially reunified and declared a socialist republic. Its main ally was the Soviet Union as China had shifted its allegiance to the Khmer Rouge seeing Cambodia as a counterweight to Soviet influence in South-East Asia. This state of affairs would lead to two more wars in which Vietnam would overthrow Pol Pot and defend itself from Chinese retaliation.

Tuesday, 2 September 2014

What buttons does Putin push?


The national psyche of any country may be made up by a complex web of associations in memory and myth running through history, culture and literature. It would be very easy to put down all of Russia's problems to its long history of authoritarian rule and chauvinism. However, we must remain aware that this is itself a construction of how the West would like to see itself - as standing out against the wretched backwardness of the East. This is a projection and we shouldn't fall into the convenience of old ideas in new conflicts. In fact, that's sort of the problem the Russians are having in the recrudescence of nationalism. I've covered this:

One of the first decisions undertaken by Putin after the 2000 election was to restore the Soviet National Anthem by Alexander Alexandrov. It was a symbolic break with the Yeltsin era. The anthem replaced the Patriotic Song of Mikhail Glinka that the Russian Federation had adopted in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR. Many in the West perceived this as an ominous sign of things to come. As the 1996 election was deemed to be the last hope for Russia’s Communists, the alternative to Yeltsin had always been framed as a throwback to the days of Stalin. 
The return of Alexandrov’s anthem seemed to confirm Putin was looking to recreate the old Soviet Union. This perception was widely shared, particularly by free market advocates, fearful that their revolution was coming to and end. Leading liberal Grigory Yavlinsky said, “We see this as a signal of where our society is heading, of what awaits us in the near future”. Yavlinsky was a proponent of the 500 Day Programme, first articulated in the late 1980s. It called for the mass-privatisation of state assets combined, with market reforms and the stripping away of regulations. All in 500 days. The programme was eventually implemented, in diluted form, under Yeltsin. 
What was lost on market liberals like Yavlinsky was that it wasn’t just about economics. The Soviet anthem has an equally significant nationalist side to it. After all it comes from Stalin’s Great Patriotic War, and supplanted the traditional socialist anthem the Internationale with its revolutionary patriotism. It was this side of the Russian campaign that Putin was tapping into, not a retreat back to the state capitalism of the Communist era.

The Russian nationalist narrative has a lot of sway and popular appeal because it holds factual ground. That isn't to say it is accurate of the full story. Pavel Stroilov recently produced an article exploring the popular claim in Russia that the West - principally, manifested in its expansion of NATO eastwards - reneged on its promises at the end of the Cold War. Stroilov put his own right-wing perspective on it and appears to be woefully uncritical of NATO and Western foreign policy. Even still, it is worth a read. You can read the rest of my article on Russian nationalism at Souciant.

Saturday, 16 August 2014

On the Khmer Rouge trial.


I've written about Cambodia and the period of Angkar rule (1975-79) in the past. So I felt it necessary to cover the recent verdicts at the trial of Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. It is an obscenity that the core of the leadership has gotten away with it all. Khieu Samphan may be the biggest prize here, but it would have been a great day to see Saloth Sar (a.k.a. "Pol Pot") in the dock. It would have been even better to have seen Henry Kissinger in the dock with him for his part in sanctioning the illegal bombing of Cambodia which precipitated the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Here's a snippet:

The Khmer Rouge got off easy. No act of genocide is as misunderstood as the murderous campaign that the Maoist revolutionaries undertook during the second half of the 1970s. Two million Cambodians were murdered in the space of four years. The scale of the killings, and the ruthlessness with which they were conducted, shocked the West, which was still struggling to get its head around the Holocaust, just three decades earlier.


The idea that an anti-colonial conflict, so soon afterwards, had turned so barbarous, was particularly difficult to digest, especially in the context of popular resentment against the war in Vietnam. The people, so to speak, had proven no better than the imperialists, first the French, and then the Americans, who had spent the better part of the post-war period trying to stamp out the threat of socialism in Southeast Asia, killing millions, themselves.

There are many inconvenient truths about the Khmer Rouge. Like the fact that Prince Sihanouk embraced Pol Pot as an ally, along with Ronald Reagan, and George HW Bush, against the Vietnamese forces which removed the Khmer Rouge in 1979. That the Western powers provided food and training as long as they were 'resisting' Vietnam's occupation. John Pilger and Peter Jennings have both covered this.

Monday, 28 April 2014

'Russia On My Mind'.




It was a tremendous pleasure to find The Guardian holding forth on JG Ballard earlier this month. John Gray and China Mieville, among others, put pen to paper to mark the fifth year since Ballard's passing. I've long been a fan of Ballard and my blog has been a platform for posts on his work from time to time. Below I have reproduced Zinovy Zinik's interview with JG Ballard from 1998. This is one of many fascinating back-and-forths to be found in 'Extreme Metaphors: Interviews with JG Ballard, 1967-2008' (2012). It's an enthralling read and carries great insights into the work of one of the most significant writers of post-war Britain. Here we find Ballard's perspective on the Soviet Union and the Cold War, as well as more broadly his own political beliefs.

ZINIK: Has the end of communist Russia marked the end of two centuries of social engineering?
BALLARD: The end of social utopia? Yes, and many of my left-wing friends felt a distinct pain when it all ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, etc. I did so too myself, since heroic experiments have to be admired despite sometimes vast human cost. I even remarked to my ex-CP girlfriend, “Now’s the time to join the Communist Party,” only to be told by her rather bitterly that there wasn’t one to join – in the UK. (I was actually a great if partial admirer of Margaret Thatcher for her attempt to Americanise the British people.) Bourgeois life has triumphed, and the suburbanisation of the planet and the universal acceptance of the shopping mall have now virtually put an end to politics. What we have is the commodification of everything, including ideologies, and government by advertising agency – as in Blair’s New Britain.
I think we’ve now gone beyond politics into a new and potentially much more dangerous realm where non-political factors will pull the levers of power – these may be vast consumer trends, strange surges in the entertainment culture that dominates the planet, quasi-religious eruptions of the kind we saw at Diana’s death, mass paranoia about new diseases, aberrant movements in popularised mysticism, and the growing dominance of the aesthetic (which I prophesied twenty years ago). The only ballot box common to all these is the cash register, an extremely accurate gauge of consumer preference in the very short term but useless beyond the next five minutes.
All this leaves the human race extremely vulnerable to any master manipulator. I’ve remarked elsewhere that messiahs usually emerge from deserts, and I expect the next Adolf Hitler or Mao to emerge from the wilderness of the vast North American and European shopping malls. The first credit-card Buddha, at its best, or, at its worst, the first credit-card Stalin.
ZINIK: To what extent was Soviet communism unique – or was it rather yet another example fo the tyrannical manipulation of human idealistic urges and instinct for survival, too familiar to the Western mind through two thousand years of Christianity? With your childhood experience in China under the Japanese, how familiar does the proverbial Soviet horror seem to you?
BALLARD: Tyrannies usually self-destruct in years rather than decades, at least in the modern epoch, and the survival of the old Soviet Union for the greater part of the last century is a remarkable event. Stalin dominated much of that time, and he was lucky to have had so many enemies. I see him primarily as a war leader, first raging [sic] war against large elements of his own people, then leading the battles against Hitler and the unbeatable USA. Presumably the Soviet system delivered more than people give it credit for – the whole country organised like a vast internment camp, with all the boredom and dulling of hope and enterprise but an underlying sense of security.
Despite World War II, a reasonable level of prosperity reached the Russian masses, but of course the constraints of the system prevented them from ever moving beyond the subsistence level. I remember driving through Yugoslavia in 1962 and seeing a complete new town of handsomely landscaped apartment blocks, all modelled on the enlightened post-Corbusier pattern, with the ground floor divided into a dozen or so shopping units. Unhappily these concrete cells were empty, since the consumer infrastructure didn’t exist. It was a desperate place and the dirt-poor people would stare at the European cars on their way to Greece, dreams of the West in their eyes. But after a while the dream either breaks free or dies, and people settle for the third best. Six months after the end of World War II British internees were still living in my camp outside Shanghai, subsisting in their shabby quarters on a diet of American C-rations. They had been institutionalised.
ZINIK: Most of your novels deal with different types of black utopia, with the transformation of human society and human nature into something unpredictable, mostly monstrous. Has Soviet communism (as an example of social engineering gone wrong) ever been on your mind when you contemplated such transformations in your novels? What is your attitude to anti-utopian classics such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four?
BALLARD: It was difficult for a writer like myself, who began in his career in the 1950s, not to be aware of the Soviet Union, and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four confirmed one’s fears that tyrannies can play upon people’s deep-rooted masochistic needs. One could see the Soviet Union as a kind of Sadean society of torturers and willing victims.
In the same way the Nazis seem to have exploited the latent docility of their victims. Everyone who has served in the armed forces knows that there are military bases where the regime of discipline and brutality is far more excessive than it needs to be, and yet doesn’t provoke any revolt and may even satisfy some need to be brutalised. The whole socialist project may fit into the same scheme. Where socialist systems endure for decades, as in China and the Soviet Union, they do so because people unconsciously want things to get worse, rather than better.
Brave New World, a masterpiece of a novel, takes the process one step farther and is uncannily accurate in its prediction of the society we are now becoming: soma, feelies, test-tube babies. I’ve always suspected that the Soviet Union was the last of the old-style authoritarian tyrannies. The totalitarian systems of the future will be obsequious and subservient, plying us with drinks and soft slippers like a hostess on an airliner, adjusting our TV screen for us so that we won’t ask exactly where the plane is going or even whether there is a pilot on board.
ZINIK: The Soviet utopia, unlike the utopian dreams of the English sectarians of the seventeenth century, was born out of the French as well as the German idea of the collective, of the state being responsible for the individual. You have witnessed the collective dance of the ‘flower power generation’ in the swinging 60s in London, as well as French intellectuals’ obsessions with the Chinese notion of the rule of the collective. Did it affect at all your mode of thinking? Reading your novels, one comes to the conclusion that the human mind, with its innate propensity for barbarism, is always in need of some kind of irritant drug, some black territory of total anarchy, and a zone in which it could play out its fantasies, including social experiments. You once said that we live in the age that gave birth to the cross-breed of reason and nightmare. The Soviet nightmare was very much an illustration of this idea. How come you never refer to the Soviet experience in your prose?
BALLARD: If I haven’t referred to the Soviet experience it is partly because I’ve never been there, and chiefly because I’ve been more interested in the latent pathology of the consumerist West, which is where the entire planet seems to be heading.
Also I am not sure if the Soviet Union was a special case. Did Russia industrialise too quickly? Did it educate its population too quickly? Did it place too great a reliance on science? Did it make a mistake abolishing religious practice? Its tragedy was that it was obliged to fight the bloodiest war in history against an advanced nation in the grip of ideological madness. But for Hitler and the Nazis, could Stalin and the Soviet leaders have maintained their brutal grip for so long?
Is a communist system inherently dependent on the creation of enemies to justify its repressions, given that communism runs counter to almost all human social tendency? If you want to destroy the economy of an advanced nation, introduce it to socialism, say American supply-siders led by Milton Friedman et al., and they may well have a point.
ZINIK: Do you see Russia as one of those zones where the Western mind can go and experience something which is unacceptable in one’s own country? How would you describe the type of society that attracts minds which are usually either bored, lonely, excited, disrespectful of moral implications, or naïve and idealistic, blind to the nastiness behind the bright façade?
BALLARD: One has to remember that despite the antagonisms of the past half-century and the threat of nuclear war, a huge reservoir of goodwill towards the Russian people exists in the West. This is quite unlike some Western responses to the Germans, who are not much liked by their European neighbours and certainly not trusted. Memories of the Franks go back a long way, all the way to the Romans, who never conquered them and, if I remember correctly, received a chilling shock when several of their legions made the mistake of crossing the Rhine and were massacred to the last man.
But Russians are perceived in a very positive light, as affable and likeable people. I have known a good number of Russians in my life: during my Shanghai childhood I had several White Russian nannies, and many White Russian men were employed as garage owners, dentists, doctors and so on, as well as foremen and drivers. They were all likeable characters. If Western visitors are going to Russia to gaze at the relics of socialism for reasons of nostalgia, that amazes me.
ZINIK: Could one speculate about some kind of energy points (‘G-spots’ in social structures) without which humankind withers and dies in passivity? Is Russia one of those points on the political map of the world, which provokes, like infection, self-destructive urges in some people? Is it possible to describe such a temperament? Do you recognise among your characters those who might be attracted to Russia?
BALLARD: I suppose, from the standpoint of evolutionary biology, there must be a reason why a huge and diverse nation with a highly educated elite should choose to enslave itself for seventy years, but it’s hard to find one. Perhaps, historically, Russia was very late in developing a middle-class, so that until the start of the twentieth century there was almost nothing between aristocracy and the rural and urban working-class, a set-up that stops the clocks, as you can see in any banana republic or oil sheikhdom. The USA and Japan are the exact opposite, almost entirely composed of the middle-class, who are intensely insistent on their civic rights, like any Whig mercantile class. I’m afraid my characters would not be attracted to Russia, since all my heroes are mavericks.
ZINIK: You once remarked that Marxism is a philosophy for the poor and that we need to develop a philosophy for the rich. We shouldn’t forget, of course, the fact that the ideas of the French Enlightenment and French Revolution are as much responsible for the creation of the Soviet utopia as they are – in a more immediate sense – responsible for the birth of the United States of America.
The cherished Russian notions of suffering and sacrifice in the name of collective welfare were historically juxtaposed in the twentieth century to those of American self-promotion and happiness. One could say the Cold War was fought over the wrong interpretation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Do you see these two types of ideals as mirroring each other? Is the brainwashing by commercial advertising comparable to that by Soviet ideology, the living dead of American consumerism not dissimilar to the victim of the Soviet totalitarianism?
BALLARD: You use the word ‘utopia’ a lot in connection with Soviet history, but this only applies in the most abstract and notional sense. For most of the time the former Soviet Union was a dystopia of alarming durability. Having myself experienced cold, hunger and disease during the war, I can’t imagine how they could ever serve a glorious end, and there is no way in which Russian suffering is some kind of mirror image of American consumer plenty. Eastern Europeans and Russians, like people from the developing world, have always been astonished by American plenty, by vast supermarkets and shopping malls crammed to the ceiling with a king’s ransom of consumer goods.
They fail to realise that Americans themselves are not in the least awestruck by their own superabundance, and in fact take it completely for granted. They expect a refrigerator to have an automatic ice-cube maker, just as they expect a car to have a powerful heater and a four-speaker sound system. The richest society is one where everyone is a millionaire but is unaware of the fact; a state that already exists on the Upper East Side of New York.
Sadly, Russians will probably still feel poor even when surrounded by a lavish consumer culture. There are Marxist interpretations of American consumer culture, which believe that American capitalism has entrapped and pacified the working-class by beguiling them with the opium of meretricious consumer goods. But this analysis seems desperate to me and ignores the fact that the basic needs of the working-class, e.g. for personal transport and food refrigeration, are fully genuine needs, and the cars and refrigerators in question are superb functional examples of their kind.
The same applies to advertising, which people in the developing world assume Americans are brainwashed by. In fact Americans are scarcely aware of the advertising around them. Today’s Russian intelligentsia would make a huge error if they equated American consumerism with Soviet totalitarianism. They would make the same mistake if they assumed that Americans, Europeans and others in the developed world are brainwashed by the dominant entertainment culture of Hollywood films, TV and popular music. All this is merely a sea in which everyone floats.
In fact, I often wonder if people here rare really immersed in this sea at all. It forms the background to their lives, like a TV set left on in a room that no one is watching. This explains the apparent contradiction of these comments with those I made in answer to your opening question. The consumer and entertainment landscape dominates everything, but it’s nothing but wallpaper.
ZINIK: On the other hand, what about the need for an enemy which satisfies the no less acute urge for self-righteousness among us? With the end of the Cold War, what would replace Soviet totalitarianism in the role of intellectual enemy?
BALLARD: The real problem is that it (the consumer and entertainment landscape) is the only wallpaper – every other form of competition for people’s attention and imaginations has been vanquished. If people were alert and critical of their consumer environment there would be some hope that they might change or penetrate it.
Similarly, if there were a conspiracy by manipulators behind the scenes there would be the hope that people might wake up. But there is no conspiracy. This leaves people in a valueless world, wandering like aimless Saturday crowds through the great supermarket of life. Under the placid surface of their minds, dreams stir the strange phantoms and pseudo-religions that we spelled out earlier.

Saturday, 19 April 2014

Cockburn on Spain.


I've just been flicking through the pages of The Devil's Decade (1973) by Claud Cockburn, in which he has a chapter on the Spanish Civil War, entitled The Battle for Spain: Triumph of the Right. This is not so surprising as Cockburn was a Communist agitator in the 1930s and covered the Spanish revolution and its fight for survival. He was not totally exceptional as a British aristo abroad fighting for a cause which seemed insane to the ruling-classes of the day. Here's an excerpt I quite like:
 
Outside Spain, the event was noted with generally calm incomprehension. A general election had taken place, a shift to the Left had been registered. 
Europe north of the Pyrenes was in the main ignorant of the state of mind of the Spanish working people; was indifferent to it; and would in any case have found it unintelligible. 
Those whose business it was to observe the course of events found it impossible to convey their nature and significance to populations cocooned in their political habits. Some tried to translate Spanish into French or English by seeking comparisons with the mood of revolutionary Europe in 1848 or of the Paris Commune of 1871. The translation was rough indeed, the analogy distant. 
It was justified in one sense only: in Spain now, as in those great European explosions of the nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of people - in Spain millions - were motivated and propelled by a good hope that the moment had come when man could remake his world; that he could master his circumstances; that liberty could cease to be an empty word, and work be no longer a dreary one. They did not accept that Utopia must be a sick delusion. 

These words must have been bittersweet for Cockburn who had seen the defeat of Spain's revolutionaries by Fascism first hand. It was a defeat which the Western powers had colluded in (along with Stalin) to stomp out an alternative vision of society. It would be four decades until Spain was emancipated from the jackboot of Franco's regime. It's an important lesson in the dark times in which we as leftists live. Many years later in the final years of the twentieth century Claud's eldest son Alexander Cockburn would write: "These days we're shy imaginers of Utopia. We know we live in the age of iron, lamented by Hesiod and Ovid. All the more reason not to lose heart. There is abundance, if we arrange things differently. The world can be turned upside down; that is, the right way up. The Golden Age is in us, if we know where to look, and what to think."

Monday, 10 March 2014

How a Communist turned Graham Greene Catholic.


A drinking partner and compatriot of Graham Greene was the journalist Claud Cockburn. The same Claud Cockburn fought in Spain alongside rival George Orwell and operated The Week in the 1930s leading the charge against 'appeasement' of Nazi Germany. He took aim at the pro-Nazi elements within the Conservative establishment and dubbed them "the Cliveden set" as they gathered around Nancy Astor at her stately home in Buckinghamshire. By then Cockburn and Greene had been friends for many years as they had met as students in the incestuous halls of Oxford where the spawn of the elite rubbed shoulder with future radicals. It was at Oxford that the young Greene first decided to convert to Catholicism (in order to marry). This would later become a defining issue for future biographers. Claud Cockburn regarded Green’s conversion in a more mundane light:

“I knew him before Vivien. Quite early on, Graham said to me that he had fallen madly in love with this girl, but she wouldn’t go to bed with him unless he married her. So I said, ‘Well, there are lots of other girls in the world, but still if that’s the way you feel, well go ahead and marry her. What difference does it make?’ And then he came back and said (this went on over quite a number of weeks), ‘The trouble is that she won’t marry me unless I become a Catholic.’ I said, ‘Why not? I you’re really so obsessed with this girl, you’ve got to get it out of your system.’ He was rather shocked, because he said, ‘You of all people, a noted atheist.’ I said, ‘Yes, because you’re the one that’s superstitious, because I don’t think it matters. If you worry about becoming a Catholic, it means you take it seriously, and you think there is something there.’ I said, ‘Go right ahead – take instruction or whatever balderdash they want you to go through if you need this for your fuck, go ahead and do it, and as we both know the whole thing is a bloody nonsense. It’s like Central Africa – some witch doctor says you must do this before you can lay the girl.’ And then to my amazement the whole thing suddenly took off and became serious and he became a Catholic convert. So I felt perhaps I’d done the wrong thing.”

Claud Cockburn was later listed as the 84th most dangerous Communist on earth by Joe McCarthy. What an honour! Though by then Cockburn had left the Communist Party and moved to the Irish Republic where he wrote under an array of pseudonyms to support his growing family. When Cockburn came to adapt his book Beat the Devil (1951) for the silver screen - and a damn fine film it would become! - he was faced with the trouble of his politics. In the end Truman Capote was given the credit for the project. Meanwhile, Graham Greene had grown bored with Vivien, moved onto prostitutes, kept up the drinking pace, then married another woman, and then another.

Wednesday, 18 December 2013

Moral Objectivity in History.

 



2.1 The Means to an End
 

In the instance of the American Civil War it isn’t particularly difficult to take Marx and Engels as being on the ‘right side’ by their own analysis of the world-historical situation. The pre-conditions for socialism are generated by the capitalist system, in its creation of a material surplus, as well as the development of democratic institutions and civil liberties. Capitalism would develop to such an extent that it would further its own demise, its crises would become more and more destructive each time. Yet the destructive capacities of capitalism are what lead to the revolutionary change, which is itself based upon the material advances made under capitalism.  It is this teleological model which raises a troubling question of historical development as constituted by a succession of stages, each one necessary and justifiable in its own terms. As if the means necessary to bringing the end into fruition will be justifiable in those terms. It would seem as though injustice now is necessary for justice later, as Terry Eagleton puts it.[1]

In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels are sure to criticise the utopian socialists in relying on claims of ‘justice’ and ‘morality’ to chastise the social order for its ills. This is a current found elsewhere in Marx’s work, for instance, when he scolds Karl Heinzen for appealing to ‘humanity’ in his vision for a socialist republic.[2] As Hobsbawm notes, the point of these polemics was anti-utopian as part of the overall project to develop a scientific socialism.[3] To this end Marx set out to demystify the economic system and its inner-workings to release the socialist movement from its ensnarement and thereby get beyond the petty moralistic rhetoric rather than theory. For Marx the trouble with moralism, in Eagleton's words, is that “it abstracts ‘moral values’ from the whole historical context in which they are set, and then generally proceeds to hand down absolute moral judgements.”[4] This is far from irrelevant, as we will see, in Marx’s analysis of British-ruled India.

In Marx’s eyes British rule in India was creating the necessary pre-conditions for the colonial shackles they had imposed on the country to be thrown-off.[5] We find this when he writes “When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous Pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.”[6] The hierarchy presupposed here – capitalism over pre-capitalist formations, communism over capitalism – brings us back to the distinction between political emancipation and human emancipation that was made in the Jewish Question. Marx recognises that the “misery inflicted by the British on Hindustan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindustan had to suffer before.”[7] He takes this to be a revolutionary transformation of India, namely the huge costs to bear, in ‘blowing up’ the material basis of its mode of production. The British were only moved by the ‘vilest of interests’ to change India in this way and Marx concludes that the British behaved as “the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution”.[8]

In this moment it would seem as though Marx finds that the consequences of grotesque actions may be progressive. He goes on to describe the Indian mission of the British as a duality: regenerative in one way, destructive in another.[9] Cohen makes the point that injustice can have extrinsic value even as it has intrinsic disvalue.[10] He notes that the disvalue of slavery is to be abolished, while the pyramids hold intrinsic value and should be preserved. Yet the latter may not have emerged without the former. We find the same with capitalist class society, as Cohen writes that Marx found socialism “necessary to preserve the fruits of civilisation against the ravages of capitalism.”[11] Socialism is to be the advance upon the achievements of capitalist society, the level of productive forces is not to be diminished nor is the process of wealth creation to be abandoned. It’s to do with the technical distribution, ownership and control of property and the means of production rather than a primitivist rejection of all those elements. This might be a part of the reason that Marx seems to use ‘civilisation’ as a synonym for capitalism, and ‘barbarism’ for its less advanced predecessors: considering the British as ‘superior’ to all previous conquerors whom he deems ‘barbarian’.

We may say that Marx overestimated the ‘revolutionary potential’ of capitalism to overturn all pre-existing forms of hierarchy and domination. Britain is a good example of a capitalist society where the remnants of the feudal past remain intact in the continuation of the monarchy, lords and the state-church. Likewise the caste system of India has survived the explosive development of capitalism in that country. Not all pre-capitalist formations are strictly incompatible with capitalist development. Far from it, some appear to be complimentary. It would appear contradictions can be sustained for a long time in this way. It may be that in his haste to throw-out the baggage of evaluative judgements (of claims to morality and justice) it would seem as though Marx can’t help but bring on board his own. The evaluative implications of these points on India seem to place Marx among the ranks of liberal apologists for empire. What differentiates Marx from this crowd is the awareness of the huge human costs of historical development. The means and the ends are askew.

According to Alasdair MacIntyre, there are at least two ways in which Marx uses morally evaluative language: to simply a) help describe actions and institutions adequately as no words could rise to provide an account of slavery without condemnatory tones, as well as to b) explicitly criticise the system on its own standards, terms and values.[12] The first application is consistent with the precepts of Marx’s theory of history, in that it takes events in a historic context. Slavery is taken as an institution of a different time, pre-capitalist and transient it should be superseded by the rising dynamism of capitalism. The second point seems more of a tactical application to turn the standards of the period against itself whenever possible. No doubt it is more about the maintenance of an oppositional standpoint. This would take the historical modes of production to constitute self-containing epochs wherein an array of values can be encapsulated. In describing slavery there is no appeal to transcendent standards except insofar as we are looking at slavery as part of a historic linear pattern.

MacIntyre argues that this is consistent if you begin at the same point as Marx, e.g. that there is a class conflict situated in material-historical conditions.[13] It doesn’t seem as though any appeals to social justice can be made within this framework. As that would lose sight of the bourgeoisie as a class in its role as incapable of moving beyond the system to which they belong. The appeal to moral principles always presupposes a shared moral vocabulary within the existing state of affairs. The moral values of the bourgeoisie make sense, for they are values moulded to fit with the structures of class oppression and exploitation, of which they are the beneficiaries. No amount of philanthropy will suffice as it necessarily takes place internal to class hierarchy; it requires the processes of accumulation and dispossession as its starting point. By analogy we may look at social democratic reform as a means of taming the system’s excesses, its answer is to conserve the system by improving it.

In the terms of the bourgeois period of development, as Marx would insist, exploitation is not an unjust means to an end; rather it is – apart of the means of production, distribution and exchange – when held to the standards of its own historical epoch.[14] In this way Marx rejected the claims that the mode of exploitation was ‘unjust’ in that it is consistent on its own terms. In his lexicon ‘exploitation’ designates a technical aspect of the productive process, in that through the extraction of minerals we exploit them. It carries little in the way of moral connotations in this way. This is not the position of an amoralist or a relativist, as we shall see. The ways in which the bourgeoisie have shaped the world may have more than the intended consequences. The spread of the nation-state model around the world through European colonialism created the basis for national liberation movements to emerge. Perhaps it may be possible to salvage Marx on India in this way. For there to be a resistance first to colonialism and then to capitalism, there has to be the entity to resist against in the first place. The opposition to ‘civilising missions’ may be found to be dialectical: the process by which pre-capitalist modes are overcome creates the basis for the emergence and eventual fall of capitalism.

This is not inherently anti-imperialist on its own, though it is possible to shift to an oppositional position insofar as the negation of certain conditions can't be accomplished without such an element. We’d do better to scrutinise the language of historical inevitability and necessity. It is in the conditions of the existing order wherein the future can begin to emerge. In the actions undertaken to build socialism out of capitalist crisis it is the bourgeois order that provides those actions with a starting-point. On these grounds Marx found good reason to write “The bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world.”[15] The emphasis on ‘has to’ rather than ‘will lead to’ seems not to imply that the stages of colonialism and capitalism will inevitably lead to emancipation. Given that the period of bourgeois rule is transient rather than permanent ‘it has’ to be superseded by an emancipatory epoch. The hope seems to be that the advent of socialism can make up for the enormous suffering under the preceding modes of exploitation.

 

2.2 Historical Inevitability and Necessity

 
The necessity of particular conditions for the advancement of material development does not amount to inevitability. Contingency is not removed an impossibility in the transience of these epochs. For the possibility of socialism arrives under conditions of a highly advanced capitalist system, wherein contradictions and crises can coalesce with the movements of the day to facilitate the construction of socialism. In this way Marx claimed that each crisis of capitalism would be worse than the last and this in turn makes socialism increasingly feasible.[16] The feasibility of the socialist project does not equate to its automatic appearance upon the collapse of capitalism. Decades later, Rosa Luxemburg argue that the capitalist system is limited as its own accumulative capacities run up against the scarcity of plundered resources, its own death knell perhaps contained in its inability to turn back from perpetual expansion.[17] Just as Rosa Luxemburg was not putting forward the case for a passive proletariat neither were Marx and Engels. Whether or not socialism ‘has to’ happen matters not, history may still culminate in barbarism. Marx briefly acknowledges this in the Manifesto when he notes the plausibility of this process amounting to the ‘common ruination of all classes’.[18]

On these grounds we may say that Marx did not view socialism as a strictly inevitable stage in history which would supersede capitalism in automatic succession. This interpretation would fit much better with the early emphasis on human agency and praxis against the determinism that may be read into his work. It was a reasonable assumption that we may overthrow capitalism before it exhausts the basis for its own perpetuation. In these terms socialism seems more like a necessary step, rather than an inevitable one in this understanding of history. It would appear that there was space for human agency within Marx’s framework. In the Brumaire Marx famously writes “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.”[19] The actions undertaken freely by a class-conscious proletariat are made in accordance with particular circumstances, where the proper conditions may facilitate a revolutionary leap. The system may have the potential to destroy itself through a terminal crisis but that alone wouldn't bring on socialism automatically. The development of the productive forces under capitalism may prepare the ground for socialism, but it's up to the workers to take action.

In line with this emphasis on human agency there is the possibility of applying a moral vocabulary which does not presuppose the existing order we’re living in. MacIntyre speculates that it may be found in the expression of wants and needs which cannot be satisfied within existing society.[20] This would almost make moral values into a set of ‘transitional demands’ that the market system cannot meet and thereby necessitate the establishment of a new order.[21] Socialism enters here as a competing model able to meet the wants and needs of the proletariat under capitalism. There seems to be a problem here, as a moral vocabulary which does not presuppose the existing order may appeal to non-relative standards and values as transcendent to the historical process. It is a possibility that Marx rules out as a necessary part of his theory of history. But if moral values cannot be taken as universal, in a trans-historical or even ahistorical manner, then it would seem that the Marxist historiography is at risk of collapsing into a form of descriptive relativism without much to offer in normative terms.

By the 1870s Marx had attracted attention from radicals far and away; one of them was the Narodnik theoretician Nikolai Mikhailovsky who found fault with Marx’s thesis. In his nostalgia for primitive communalism Mikhailovsky found Marx’s thesis of a historically inevitable shift to capitalism untenable.[22] The Narodnik movement saw the peasant commune as a means of bypassing capitalist development.[23] In response Marx emphasised that the path of capitalist emergence he laid out in Capital was unique to European history and not necessarily universal.[24] Historical materialism is not a historico-philosophical theory encompassing all possible paths under all conceivable circumstances. The contours of Russian historical development may differ enormously due to radically differing conditions and variables. Marx clarifies the application of his thesis to Russia:

 

…if Russia tries to become a capitalist nation, in imitation of the nations of western Europe, and in recent years she has taken a great deal of pains in this respect, she will not succeed without first having transformed a good part of her peasants into proletarians; and after that, once brought into the lap of the capitalist regime, she will be subject to its inexorable laws, like other profane nations.[25]

 

This is the reason why appeals to universal principles of justice and morality were to be resisted. It seems consistent with the self-contained view of history, which MacIntyre elaborates, as well as open to a multi-linear conception of historical development. Yet if the materialist conception of history amounted to a relativisation of epochs then it might only be descriptive and lack any capacity to advocate a position. This seems to be contradictory. As the Marxist project is an analysis directed towards certain political ends it cannot be cut-off and read just as a theory of capitalism. Towards the end of his life Marx would correspond with another Russian radical Vera Zasulich, this time directly on the question of the model of the peasant commune. Once again Marx would emphasise that ‘historical inevitability’ only really applied in Western Europe where the transition from feudalism and slavery had been made much earlier than in Russia.[26] And that the transition to capitalism was undertaken through the transformation of common property into private property. He notes that it may be possible through the peasant commune to acquire “a new skin without beginning by its suicide.”[27] By developing the land as commonly owned it can lay the basis for future development without privatisation and the ‘capitalist regime’ may be bypassed, albeit with the use of resources which can hardly be taken to be socialist. In this we may see a less rigid framework, as Marx seems to open to the possibility of synchronous rather than sequential development. Marx seemed to adjust to particular developments in the world-historical situation.

It may be argued that Marxism doesn’t have a moral approach to history, but it does have a historical approach to moral questions. As Sean Sayers argues, the problem may be the dichotomy of relativism and universalism.[28] Marx's position fits neither in his commitment to moral realism at the normative level and historical relativism at the descriptive level of analysis. Sayers argues that the existing social order holds within it the forces which not only sustain it but the forces that oppose it.[29] Society is contradictory, its changes are driven by these contradictions and it seems possible that the moral critique of society can come about within that society. This understanding of morality as historical is the basis on which a moral and political position may be predicated.[30] As the class struggle is historically situated we might adapt Trotsky’s point that the means may be justified by the end, but the end in its turn has to be justified in turn.[31] It is the historical interests of the proletariat which are the criteria in such case.[32] The presupposition being a rejection of the rigid fact-value distinction to hold that the objective and the subjective cannot be disentangled with ease. In this way the Marxist tradition may be taken as a kind of naturalism, it is not simply ‘confusing’ judgements of facts with those of evaluative content – it is that there is no strict separation of values from facts.[33] In similar spirit Trotsky writes Marxism “does not know dualism between means and end. The end flows naturally from the historical movement. Organically the means are subordinated to the end. The immediate end becomes the means for a further end.”[34]

There is no need for transcendent standards, or even trans-historical principles, as the objectivity of moral values cannot be separated from historical contours which are relative and contingent.[35] Yet the capitalist system may be an advance upon its predecessors in relative terms, the historical approach must hold some normativity for one mode of production to be seen as a progression on another. Socialism is inseparable from the conditions created by capitalism, its objectivity is rooted in the critical-historical analysis of political economy. Capitalism can be criticised from a post-capitalist standpoint, with the objective claims as a necessary part of the analysis.[36] Moral criticism is not merely immanent or tactical then, it is almost prefigurative. In that the analysis of the capitalist system necessarily leads to longstanding goals and the alternative. The Marxist critique of capitalism is neither ahistorical nor relativist, as Marxism is not welded to the capitalist system nor is it transcendent in absolutist fashion.  Once capitalism has been superseded and the socialist transition accomplished Marxism may hold little relevance in its analysis of the existing order.

With all of this in mind there is another distinction worth making. Marx may view moral claims as ideological, but he accepts the moral claims of emancipation.[37] Perhaps this is because such claims may lead towards a post-capitalist morality. After all it is the case that the Marxist project is to overcome the conditions of subjugation which hold women and men in constant toil for the enrichment of others in a denial of their species-being. As Terry Eagleton writes that Marx's moral inquiry “refuses to divorce human values, behaviour, relationships and qualities from the social and historical forces which shape them.”[38] Before going on to add that Marx “belonged to the great Aristotelian tradition for which morality was not primarily a question of laws, obligations, codes and prohibitions, but a question of how to live in the freest, fullest, most self-fulfilling way.”[39]

If we accept that there is no inevitable link between capitalism and socialism. That isn’t to say that post-capitalist society is not external to the historical process, the lower phase of communism develops from capitalism as its starting-point. Communism is not a ‘moral ideal’ but the product of the same historical line. It is the abolition of the present state of things to paraphrase Marx in the Manifesto.[40] It constitutes the break with ‘pre-historic’ modes of exploitation after which history proper can begin. But it must begin then with premises set within capitalism, as Marx reassures us in the German Ideology “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.”[41]

 

Conclusion

 
Overall there is no one implication to be taken away from all of this. What we have looked at is still far removed from the recent developments in discourse around interventionism. Rather the implications of Marx’s historiography may hold more sway in the analysis of the world-historical situation. There may be no definitive answer on interventionism yet, and certainly not to be uncovered in a project such as this. Nevertheless, I think we may take a few modest points from all this.

We saw in the first section that taking capitalism as a historical mode of production can have positive implications with regard to conflict. This invokes evaluative claims that take capitalism as an advance on feudalism and slavery. The language of human rights and civil liberties may well serve as a means of progression from conditions of pre-capitalist servitude, or even authoritarianism, but it shouldn’t be taken as the end itself. Human emancipation won’t be hastened just by granting rights and freedoms to individuals, it requires a major transformation of the means of production and the relations within those means in order to move towards a more meaningful form of emancipation. In this way the progressive leap from one imperfect form of society to a more perfect form, in that the barriers to greater self-realisation are circumvented.

In the second section we looked at Marx’s more controversial writing on the consequences of British colonial rule in India. Here we find Marx taking a similar position to the liberals of his day, except for different reasons; he doesn’t take the British Empire to be munificent to its colonial subjects. Rather it is a case of unintended consequences arising from grotesque actions. Progress as achieved by its ‘bad side’, with the flaws of ‘Asiatic society’ swept away for capitalism to take hold Marx sees the chance for India to move not just beyond British rule but beyond capitalism as well. The more nuanced positions may be to acknowledge the advances possibly achieved via colonialism, while retaining an oppositional stance. By comparison, Lenin was right to oppose the First World War, and yet he acted upon the basis of the coordinates defined by that war to achieve his ends. It is dialectical to at once oppose the very coordinates by which advance might later be attained.

If we are going to go ahead with these presuppositions we may move to the third section. The multi-linear conception of historical development may well mean that we have reason to shed a great deal of doubt on Marx’s position regarding India. It may be right to insist upon a multi-linear account to address this issue in order to analyse societies outside of Europe’s own shift from feudalism to capitalism in terms of their own developing path. In the recognition of the possibility of socialism in Russia Marx acknowledged that the stages of development may be leaped or compressed. The resources of capitalist production could be used to supplement the shortcomings of the peasant commune. In that sense then we may say that there are possibilities for synchronous modes of production rather than sequential epochs. Consistently Hegelian the universal is to be reached through the particular.

In contrast to the directionality of linear stages it may be possible for an open-ended conception of historical development to be constructed. The certainty of a closed teleological sequence would be diminished in this way; leaving open a much greater account for the possibility that history may culminate in barbarism. In synoptic terms we may still maintain the view of capitalism as an advance upon feudalism, yet the communist project still stands as a necessity rather than a strict inevitability. This isn’t inconsistent with the position that it may be best to try and establish socialism on the basis of a massive surplus leftover by capitalism. That’s even if it is not the case in every society.




[1] Eagleton, T; Is Marxism a Theodicy? (2010)
[2] Marx, K; Moralizing Criticism and Critical Morality (McLellan, D; Karl Marx: Selected Writings | Oxford University Press, 1977) pg.216-218
[3] Hobsbawm, E; On the Communist Manifesto (How to Change the World | Little Brown, 2011) pg.109
[4] Eagleton, T; Why Marx was Right (Yale University Press, 2011) pg.158-159
[5] Marx, K; The Future Results of British Rule in India (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.319-320
[6] Marx, K; The Future Results of British Rule in India (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.322-325
[7] Marx, K; The British Rule in India (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.301-303
[8] Ibid. pg.304-307
[9] Marx, K; The Future Results of British Rule in India (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.320-322
[10] Cohen, GA; Conservatism and Embodied Value (Oxford, 2004) pg.2
[11] Ibid. pg.34-36
[12] Macintyre, A; A Short History of Ethics (Routledge, 1991) pg.210-214
[13] Ibid.
[14] Miller, R; Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History (Princeton University Press, 1984) pg.90-91
[15] Marx, K; The Future Results of British Rule in India (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.324
[16] Cohen, GA; Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford University Press, 1978) pg.203-204
[17] Kolakowski, L; Main Currents of Marxism (Norton, 2005) pg.407-415
[18]Marx, K; The Manifesto of the Communist Party (The Revolutions of 1848 | Verso, 2010) pg.68
[19]Marx, K; The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Surveys from Exile | Verso, 2010) pg.146
[20] MacIntyre, A;  A Short History of Ethics (Routledge, 1967) pg.210-214
[21] Ibid.
[22] Marx, K; Letter to Mikhailovsky (McLellan, D; Karl Marx: Selected Writings | Oxford University Press, 1977) pg.571-572
[23] Hobsbawm, E; Marx on pre-Capitalist Formations (How to Change the World | 2011) pg.162-164
[24] Marx, K; Letter to Mikhailovsky (McLellan, D; Karl Marx: Selected Writings | Oxford University Press, 1977) pg.571-572
[25] Ibid.
[26] Marx, K; Letter to Vera Zasulich (McLellan, D; Karl Marx: Selected Writings | Oxford University Press, 1977) pg.576-577
[27] Ibid. pg.578-580
[28] Sayers, S; Analytical Marxism and Morality (Marxism and Human Nature | Routledge, 1998) pg.119
[29] Ibid. pg.116
[30] Ibid. pg.121
[31] Trotsky, L; Their Morals and Ours (1938): http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm
[32] Ibid.
[33] Sayers, S; Analytical Marxism and Morality (Marxism and Human Nature | Routledge, 1998) pg.116
[34] Trotsky, L; Their Morals and Ours (1938): http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm
[35] Sayers, S; Analytical Marxism and Morality (Marxism and Human Nature | Routledge, 1998) pg.117
[36] Ibid. pg.121-122
[37] Sayers, S; Analytical Marxism and Morality (Marxism and Human Nature | Routledge, 1998) pg.125
[38] Eagleton, T; Why Marx was Right (Yale University Press, 2011) pg.159
[39] Ibid.
[40] Marx, K; The Manifesto of the Communist Party (The Revolutions of 1848 | Verso, 2010) pg.80
[41] Marx, K; The German Ideology  (McLellan, D; Karl Marx: Selected Writings | Oxford University Press, 1977) pg.171