As
we will see the Sartrean conception of freedom is quite distinct,
even from the rest of the existentialist line of thinkers, from its
psychological starting-point to its moral outgrowth. The
starting-point Sartre takes with consciousness marks him out from his
precursors, Nietzsche saw consciousness as quite overrated.
There is an interesting convergence between the particular route
Sartre would eventually take on moral questions and the critique of
traditional morality Nietzsche had put forth in the late 19th
Century. Not to mention the highly different ideas of selfhood which
emerge from Sartre's framework and from Nietzsche's
thought-processes. To both the authentic self is something that has
to be created through a rejection of the inauthentic, which may be
constituted as a set of social norms or moral values.
We will explore Sartre's view of human freedom with critical
reference to Nietzsche where the conception seems to fall short of
its aims.
The
notion of consciousness as freedom is the vital element of Sartre’s
existential phenomenology.
It fits in with his general project that places freedom as the
central dimension of human existence. This is where the existential
themes of responsibility, commitment and notions such as bad faith
and authenticity fit into the picture as well. The modes whereby we
may relate our being to Being can be authentic and inauthentic. For
Heidegger there was more truth in authenticity as it was a
self-directed rather than a moral ideal. This is where freedom enters
with the existentialist focus on the actions we undertake and, by
extension, the way we choose to undertake them. Sartre went as far as
to claim that the actions which we undertake can have consequences
that we did not foresee and which we are responsible for insofar as
we are solely responsible for own actions. The motivations we may
hold are irrelevant insofar as they may provide ‘excuses’ which
allow us to avoid our own responsibility. This is the reason that we
fear and often shirk from the acceptance of our condition as
radically free.
When
we look at Sartre’s conception of freedom we have to keep in mind
that his body of work was a reaction to Heidegger’s hermeneutical
phenomenology. As part of Sartre’s reaction to Heidegger he
reverts to some extent back to Husserl – in that the focus of
phenomenology should be consciousness – and brings with him
modified vestments of Cartesianism which Heidegger wanted to ‘throw
out’. This conception of freedom is predicated on consciousness as
nothingness because freedom is consciousness it is detached from the
causal forces of the external world. At the same time, there is
literally nothing which traps the self ‘inside’ consciousness
because there is nothing there.
Nietzsche had noted that this particular kind of selfhood is detached
from the world of causes and that it meshes well with the purposes of
morality for this reason. Sartre may not have disagreed, his notion
of consciousness precluded it being determined.
The Ethics of Ambiguity.
It
may even be that this version of selfhood was put forward to generate
a particular kind of moral conduct. It certainly led Sartre in a
particular direction. In an attempt to craft an evaluative moral code
Sartre reached out to Kantianism with which he was very familiar. The
aim was to get away from the instability inherent in the radical
subjectivism that seemed to be built into existentialism. Even as
Heidegger preferred authentic modes of being over inauthentic modes.
It's all too clear that authentic behaviour can have consequences of
the moral and immoral kind. The amorality of authenticity in
Heidegger’s work meant that there was nothing about it which ruled
out Heidegger dabbling in the politics of the Third Reich at a moral
level. This was something that had to be rectified
for the philosophers who emerged on the other side of WW2. Especially
for the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, who had
been embedded in the French resistance.
Sartrean
thought seems far removed from Kant at the outset. It may testify to
the need for a kind of moral realism, even as Sartre rejected
Christianity and traditional modes of morality he found that he had
to go back to Kant in the end. It was the categorical imperative
which interested Sartre, it stipulated that there are objective
demands on us. It is an impersonal moral duty which takes two forms
and we have access to it through reason. Firstly, that we should "act
only on a maxim or rule that you can will to be a universal law".
And secondly that, we should "treat others as an end in
themselves, as opposed to a means to an end".
The imperative is relentless in its universalism, cutting through all
wants, desires and circumstances. This may seem completely at odds
with Sartre's framework. But the emphasis in his conception of
freedom on responsibility is compatible with Kant's insistence on
universality.
To
put it simply, when we act as individuals we act as we would expect
others to act and this is the key to morality for Sartre.
This is consistent with the Sartrean notion of freedom insofar as it
can be seen as an extension of the claim that we are responsible for
the extent that we act in accordance with our evaluative capacities.
It could be seen as built on Sartre's idea of radical choice, which
comes out of Nietzschean influences on his thinking. It was Nietzsche
who put forward the suggestion that we create values. There aren't
actually any out there for us to latch onto as the myths which
supported our values are destroyed in nihilism. The only way out is
to put man where God once was.
For Sartre we have to choose rather than create our values and this
begins with a radical choice, the act which opens up a new space of
moral conduct. But it seems that the universality Sartre wants to go
for would have the effect of instituting conformity at a
self-directed level.
This would seem to be too tight a constraint on Sartre's radical
notion of freedom. Then again it has always been the case that this
tradition has given preference to certain behaviour and attitudes, we
can see this in Nietzsche's own favouritism for master-morality.
The Radical Self.
Perhaps
then the emphasis on universality is what's wrong here and not the
framework itself. Instead morality may be about particularity, it
always boils down to a matter of interest.
But it's unclear where this takes us, if anywhere else other than a
return to the instability of moral subjectivism. It may be more in
accordance with the creation of values rather than the simple
choosing of them. Nietzsche would prefer to confront us with the idea
of the Eternal Return of the Same than a set of duties.
The Eternal Return functions as a test for one's attitude towards
life and our ability to live as ourselves without any evasive
behaviour. The test is to imagine that you would have to live your
life as it has gone so far and as it will go on over and over again
indefinitely. So any moment of life is one which we could dwell on
for all eternity. To meet this test is to affirm life and to failure
is something quite pathetic. In part this functions to push us.
Eternal Recurrence can force us in part to accept life as imperfect
it is, so that we can 'become' who we are.
Although
the alternative to moral universality seems flawed and impractical,
much more in line with being-toward-death
than any code of conduct, it seems clear that the venture into
Kantian ethics may have been a poor manoeuvre on Sartre's part.
Freedom
may be the primary dimension of human existence for Sartre, but its
symptoms include abandonment and responsibility. Existence itself is
factical because we are transcending beings, the way we exercise our
freedom can transform the circumstances under which we live. We can
remake the world and ourselves in accordance with our ideas, in doing
so our facticity is recreated. And yet we are condemned to
restlessness where we are never satisfied with our accomplishments.
Each instance of facticity cannot be taken on its own to represent
who we are, for we still have the capacity to act once again and
redefine ourselves. The real problem may lie with the elements of
Cartesianism that Sartre brings into his framework.
As
it's not clear that the certainty which Descartes attributed to
consciousness characterises it at all. For Nietzsche knowledge
involves a finite entity with finite abilities engaged with a world
of infinite becoming. The extent to which 'I' can refer to something
autonomous and total is highly suspect, as Cartesian selfhood relies
on an unsustainable dualism which cuts mind from body. Similarly
Sartre cuts the world from consciousness. Descartes would have placed
consciousness at the centre of his notion of selfhood and we can pick
up an element of this in Sartre too. But Nietzsche did not reject the
notion of a self. For Nietzsche the self is indistinguishable from
the person and the body, which are in turn embedded in a
socio-cultural context and inseparable from all sorts of contingent natural forces.
Thus the importance of culture in Nietzschean thought. The self is
always contextualised and cannot be broken-off from the world, to
pretend it can be completely detached is illusory.
The
self is not 'I' rather 'I' is just the development of the self.
