Apparently,
the Russians are leaving. Seemingly out of nowhere, Vladimir Putin
declared that the operation had “largely achieved” the desired
aims and Russian forces would be winding down operations in Syria.
Not that this means the Russian military base will be dismantled. Far
from it, the Russian invasion (yes, we shouldn’t mince words here)
has entrenched the influence over the Assad regime, which it has
strengthened. Out of 60 aircraft, the Russians have withdrawn 30. The
picture is more mixed than the announcement of the mission’s
‘success’.
Of
course, it’s not true that Islamic State has been decimated by
Russian actions, however, the real aim was to defend the Assad regime
and crush rebel groups. This may have meant bombing Islamic State’s
positions, but it mainly meant striking at groups such as Jabhat
al-Nusra, the Army of Conquest and the Free Syrian Army. These
efforts gave the Syrian regime an advantage over the rebels. While it
left Islamic State as a more distant foe. Keep in mind Bashar
al-Assad can use ISIS to justify his own position.
If
it is a choice between Islamism and Ba’athism, many would turn to
Assad for order and security over chaos and terror. This falls apart
when you look at the record. Assad has far more blood on his hands
than anyone else in Syria. Many liberal and even leftist commentators
have turned to argue for tactical and critical support for the
Ba’athists. But this means, as long as the regime remains intact,
the Arab Awakening will not have reached its conclusion.
Meanwhile
the problem for liberal interventionists is precisely the lack of any
credible force in Syria. Who do we need to defeat more? If we bomb
ISIS, we help Assad and vice versa. Can we defeat both simultaneously
and birth a secular democracy? Unlikely, as it may be, the only just
outcome would be a democratic opening. Western intervention has
served prolonged the conflict, whereas Russian involvement has
consolidated the gains of the Assad regime.
At
the same time, the Russian withdrawal sends a clear message to Assad.
There are no blank cheques, or free passes, for the Syrian regime and
Russian support may not be unconditional. Putin cannot do everything
for Assad. The Russian army obviously cannot sustain a long-term
occupation in Syria. Even the Soviet Union could not occupy
Afghanistan for as long as the US has done. In fact, the Soviet
experience in Afghanistan is particularly relevant to the Syrian
intervention.
Defeated
in slow-motion
The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came in 1979 after Hafizullah Amin
organised the death of Muhammad Taraki and seized the reins in Kabul.
Officially, the Soviet army intervened to aid the leftists in their
struggle with the Mujahideen. Yet the true purpose of the
intervention was take control of the country and restore order.
The
People's Democratic Party came to power in 1978 with the violent
overthrow of President Daoud. Once at the helm, Muhammad Taraki and
Hafizullah Amin declared a revolution and proceeded to try and
transform the country by breaking apart the remaining feudal
structures. They declared women equal, abolished shariah,
criminalised arranged marriages and began redistributing land. The
new regime began converting opium production towards agricultural
development. But these reforms would bring unforeseen consequences.
Prior
to this upheaval, the Soviet Union was more than comfortable with the
Afghan monarchy, which guaranteed stability, even as it pursued
modernisation programmes. Afghanistan itself is valuable as a source
of natural gas, but also as a route for pipelines. The revolution
threw them off and provoked rebellion in the countryside, where the
leftists were carving up the land. This would be the beginning of the
Islamist revolt. What the Soviet leaders feared most was that this
instability would engulf Central Asia.
After
all, the region was predominantly Muslim and a valuable cluster of
buffer-states between Russia and China, Iran and Pakistan. Much like
the Eastern bloc, the hold on energy-rich Central Asia helped the
USSR stand tall as a superpower. This is exactly why the US moved to
back the insurgents. The day Soviet forces crossed the border,
officially, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote to
President Carter: “We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR
its Vietnam War”.
It's
not that the Soviet leadership was ignorant of this factor. Alexei
Kosygin was opposed to sending troops to Afghanistan precisely
because of the example of Vietnam. In Kosygin’s view, the new
regime should be able to hold its own against the rebellion, as North
Vietnam had triumphed over the South and even against American
aggression. Yet the balance of forces in the Soviet leadership still
favoured intervention. In the end, Leonid Brezhnev was persuaded to
back the intervention after Hafizullah Amin had Taraki smothered with
a pillow.
Of
course, financial support for the Mujahideen was already under way
even before the invasion was launched. The CIA, with the help of
Pakistan and Saudi, had set out to built a vast network of Islamist
militants. This gave Arab regimes the opportunity to rid themselves
of these troublesome elements. Far from harbouring any regrets,
Zbigniew Brzezinski says he would do it again if he could go back. As
Brzezinski personally told Islamists in the mountains: “Your fight
will prevail... because your cause is right and God is on your side.”
Without
any institutional framework for government, the country descended
into civil war as the informal networks of power, both communal and
tribal, were easily fractured and broke apart. This process would
destroy the fabric of Afghan society. The US considered the reversal
of social progress in Afghanistan as a necessary part of the efforts
to defeat the Soviet-backed regime. Later the journalist Alexander
Cockburn would read out a portion of a document seized during the
Iran Hostage Crisis on the eve of the NATO-ISAF war in 2001:
The United States’ larger interest would be served by the demise of the Taraki-Amin regime despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reform in Afghanistan. The overthrow of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan would show the rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviet’s view of the socialist course of history being inevitable is not accurate.
Although
the Soviet intervention came with few humanitarian illusions, the
occupation would soon take the shape of the civilising missions
launched by European empires. Babrak Karmal, the leader of the
Parcham faction, was installed as leader, while the USSR set about
shaping the country in its image as it waged a brutal
counter-insurgency campaign. The new narrative would be that the
occupation was necessary to defend the rights of women from the
reactionary forces mobilising against the regime.
Realpolitik
was not enough in the end. The brutality of the Soviet occupation had
to be dressed up as an expression of solidarity justified by
socialist internationalism. As the years passed it became more and
more evident that the occupation could not be sustained. Gorbachev
would initiate an exit strategy concluding in total withdrawal in
1989. Just as the US would invade Afghanistan in 2001 in an act of
vengeance - against the same network it helped to establish years
earlier - only to discover the cause of women's rights. In both
cases, the invaders were defeated in slow-motion.
Life
after defeat
Members
of the CIA would later claim the Soviet collapse was a result of
endogenous factors. It fell apart like a house of cards because it
was a house of cards. The political system was bankrupt and no longer
functioned. So this had little to do with US policy. If anything,
observers like Archie Brown have argued the Cold War helped preserve
the USSR and not bring it down. But this was not the view taken by
the Mujahideen. Many of the Islamists believed that they helped to
bring down the USSR. They are not alone either.
Journalist
Robert Fisk takes this view. It can be argued that the defeat of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became so costly, it opened up a
space for dissidents to win major battles in Eastern Europe. This was
clear by 1981 when KGB chief Yuri Andropov (Putin’s hero,
incidentally) persuaded Brezhnev not to intervene in Poland. It was
evident that the system could not sustain such adventurism. In other
words, the USSR could not repeat the actions it took in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Hungary in 1956.
Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has been
primarily concerned with national sovereignty. This was the basis of
Boris Yeltsin’s postures over Serbia and Chechnya. The brief war
with Georgia, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, also fits this
pattern. Although Syria shares no borders with Russia, the civil war
could well have implications for Chechen jihadists. It’s easy to
sell the intervention as ‘defensive’ within Russia. Despite the
economic problems Putin can still bolster support through jingoism.
The
key question for Putin is how long can this last? Oil prices remain
low and the sanctions are hitting the government and its oligarchs.
Putin’s credibility is at stake. He is widely credited with ending
the economic chaos of the 1990s. The military adventures are
incidental, whether it’s Chechnya or Syria. If the economic
problems facing the country cannot be resolved, there may be more
trouble on the horizon.
This article was originally published at Souciant.
