So
Russia is now an active participant in the Syrian civil war. The
pretext is standard: Islamic State must be defeated at any cost to
the Syrian people. Yet the bombs are falling on other rebel targets -
al-Qaeda's Jubhat al-Nusra, no doubt - and civilian targets are not
out of bounds. Russian bombs have already hit hospitals and medical
centres. These incidents will only increase as the bombing continues
and the war continues to hurtle onward.
As
I wrote before the Russian army began bombing Syria, Vladimir Putin
has a more coherent strategy than the Western powers - which still
cling to the hope that Islamic State and Assad can be defeated at
once. Putin begins from a different premise: Assad's regime is the
most legitimate force in the war. This may be a key strength, but it
doesn't guarantee victory - nor does it justify itself. Four years of
war have left 250,000 people dead, maybe more, and displaced
millions.
No
one power seems capable of destroying the other. But this could
quickly change. Bashar al-Assad could be ousted by his generals.
Islamic State could takeover a major city and declare a new capital,
which would be a tremendous blow. That's why Assad has been so
desperate to cling onto Aleppo. If the Alawite-Sunni alliance, on
which the Syrian regime depends, collapses then there will be a
strong power vacuum.
The
endless war
In
this case, Syria will fall into the abyss, as if the conflict wasn't
already bad enough, imagine total chaos. It's plausible external
powers would back whichever factions they can to try and regain
control over the situation. There are a hand full of countries where
this has happened: Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and now Syria
possibly. It's not pretty, to put it mildly.
Russia
has been here before. In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan, first to topple Hafizullah Amin, who it found
untrustworthy and unstable, then it set about trying to turn the
Parcham wing of the People's Democratic Party into the centre of
power in the country. Babral Karmal was its Menshevik front man. The
Mujahideen, backed by the US and Pakistan, was its adversary. In the
end, the Soviet Union was humiliated.
Today
Russia cannot afford to reenact this catastrophe. Despite this
historical lesson, the Putin government has not been deterred from de
facto invading Syria on the side of the Assad regime. Up to now,
Putin was playing the distant game. In early 2013 Putin made his
stance clear at the UN Security Council and stood in unanimity with
China. When it looked like the US was getting ready for 'punitive
bombing' in August 2013 Putin was sending arms to Assad.
Now
Putin has 'little green men' flying over Syria to dump explosives on
the rebels. There has been a dramatic shift since 2013 and it may
come down to one country: Ukraine. The Russian invasion and
annexation of Crimea provoked outrage in the West and led the US and
the EU to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation. As wrong as it
was for Russian troops to march into a sovereign nation-state, the
most outraged squeals came from war criminals.
As
the Russian economy faces bleak prospects - thanks to the collapse of
oil prices, never mind the sanctions - the Ukrainian crisis is being
felt in the homes of ordinary Russians. If Putin cannot stabilise the
economy he could face serious domestic opposition. The boost in
popularity over Ukraine could easily disappear. The end of the
Yeltsin years left Putin with a great deal of credibility. He
appeared as a necessary force providing order and stability.
High-risk
strategy
According
to financial journalist Andrew Critchlow, Putin is playing a
high-risk strategy to drive oil prices up. To undermine the Russian
economy, the US and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly slashed oil prices.
This has hit Russia hard, but it also threatens to destabilise the
Saudi dictatorship. Rather than back down Putin has moved to confront
his enemies via the Syrian civil war. He has moved to strengthen the
Syrian regime and the Iranian government, which pose serious
obstacles to Saudi Arabia.
By
invading Syria, Russia can throttle the jihadi rebels mobilised by
Saudi and Qatari petro-dollars. It might be the means to exhaust the
Saudi royal family. King Salman can't afford to face chaos at home
either. If the House of Saud feels its position threatened by the
Syrian civil war it may back down. In this case, King Salman may cut
oil production to allow prices to rise. This would help ease the
strain of the Russian economy.
Along
these lines, as Critchlow's theory goes, the Syrian civil war could
threaten the ruling order in the Saudi Kingdom and the Russian
Federation. If Putin's gamble leads all sides to push harder, then
it's possible everyone would lose out. Even in that case, it's likely
oil prices will have to stabilise in the end. In the meantime, as the
civil war reaches new suicidal heights, the Syrian people are the
real losers.
If
the Russian air strikes can weaken the rebels, the Syrian regime can
hold onto its gains and may be even expand its reach. This could
force the Western powers to accept new terms of negotiation. In this
scenario, Putin will have won and the US will have been humiliated.
If Putin can do this and force the Saudis to raise oil prices this
victory will be twofold. But the stakes are high and the war is far
from cold.
This article was originally published at Souciant.
